Tuesday, March 03, 2026

When the CMD exploded- and So did I

When the CMD Exploded — and So Did I


Kathalgudi, 1994 — Steam, Gas… and Temper

In 1994, when I took charge as GM (Projects), BHEL Eastern Region, I believed I had developed a reasonably thick skin. After commissioning thermal stations across the country, I thought I understood pressure — mechanical and managerial.

Kathalgudi corrected that assumption.

This was NEEPCO’s first combined cycle power plant at Kathalgudi — a prestigious project funded under the Japanese OECF loan. Our partner was Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI). Gas turbines, steam turbines, HRSG — jointly supplied by MHI and BHEL.

Mitsubishi was performing like a disciplined samurai.
We, unfortunately, were struggling with site coordination and execution delays.

And the review meeting was to be held right there — in BHEL’s site conference hall at Kathalgudi. On the battlefield itself.

The Review That Became a Trial

The hall was full — senior officers from NEEPCO, MHI, and BHEL. The atmosphere was formal, but tight.

Chairing the review was Mr. Das, CMD of NTPC — a senior IIT Kharagpur man, much my senior in experience and stature. It was my first interaction with him.

I had joined Eastern Region barely two months earlier. Our seasoned site in-charge, SNS, had been stationed there for two years and had even toured Japan at MHI’s works. I was confident the technical aspects would be properly represented.

The meeting began smoothly.

Mr. Das was generous in his praise for Mitsubishi.

> “Excellent planning. Exemplary discipline. That is why Japan funds such projects.”



I relaxed slightly.

Then he looked up sharply.

> “Who is in-charge of BHEL here?”



I stood.

“Sir, I am S. N. Roy.”

That introduction acted like ignition in a combustion chamber.

Without giving me an opportunity to explain ground realities, he launched into a fierce criticism.

> “Shoddy execution! No seriousness! Repeated delays! This is unacceptable!”



I attempted politely:

> “Sir, if I may explain the constraints—”



But he did not allow a word.

Then came the statement that changed everything.

Turning to NEEPCO’s GM, he said:

> “Stop further payments to BHEL until performance improves.”



That was not just criticism — that was operational suffocation.

I have endured harsh reviews before. But denying payment without hearing our position? That struck at institutional dignity and practical reality.

I waited for him to finish. I allowed the steam to escape fully.

Then I replied — calmly, but firmly:

> “Sir, if payments are stopped, we cannot pay our agencies. If that is the decision, then perhaps the intention is not to complete the project. In that case, we may have to close our operations.”



You could hear the silence settle like dust after a blast.

He was clearly not accustomed to being answered back — especially by someone he probably viewed as a supplier rather than a partner.

His face tightened. Papers were gathered abruptly.

> “This is insubordination!”



And he walked out of the conference hall.

After the Storm

For a few seconds, nobody moved.

Then senior NEEPCO officers quietly approached me.

> “Mr. Roy, well said.”
“Someone had to point out the practical side.”
“We were surprised at his hostility.”



It appeared the issue was not purely technical. Sometimes authority seeks compliance more than clarity.

But the day’s drama was not over.

Dinner — The Second Act

As per tradition, we hosted a dinner in the evening for NEEPCO, MHI, and our officers.

When Mr. Das arrived, I went forward to receive him.

He looked through me as if I were invisible.

I smiled. Engineers develop insulation early in life.

After a few pegs, however, insulation failed.

He began searching for me in the gathering.

> “Roy! You think you are very smart?”



His voice was loud, animated.

My own temperature began rising again. Before I could react, GM Barkatoki of NEEPCO leaned close and whispered in my ear:

> “Mr. Roy, please ignore him. When he drinks, he doesn’t know what he is doing.”



That whisper probably prevented a second explosion.

Our senior colleague Mr. B. P. Dey tactfully moved beside him and gently steered him toward the exit, almost like taking a vibrating machine safely offline.

Once his car left, the mood changed instantly.

NEEPCO officers surrounded me — laughing.

> “Mr. Roy, this is always the last scene after a few pegs!”
“Today you were the unfortunate co-actor.”



Apparently, my response during the meeting had bruised his ego, and the dinner was his attempt at retaliation.

Fortunately, within two months he retired.

A Different Leadership

Mr. Katoki took charge thereafter — another IIT Kharagpur man, but entirely different in temperament.

Measured. Professional. Solution-oriented.

Our interactions were constructive. Issues were discussed, not dramatized.

The project regained momentum and steadily moved toward scheduled completion.

At that time, another uncertainty loomed — the shadow of ULFA activity in Assam. There were whispers, concerns, risk assessments.

I once expressed my apprehension to Mr. Katoki.

He smiled reassuringly.

> “Don’t worry, Roy. Through mediators, I have explained to them that this project will bring prosperity to Assam. Stable power means industry, employment, development. Even they understand that.”



That quiet confidence carried weight.

Management Reflections — From a Controlled Explosion

Looking back, I admit I lost my cool — but only after restraint had been exhausted.

Kathalgudi taught me:

1. Let anger exhaust itself before responding.


2. Never allow financial throttling to be used as intimidation.


3. Authority without listening weakens institutions.


4. Temperament is as critical as technical competence.


5. Projects run on trust as much as on turbines.



In engineering terms, that day was a pressure test.

The system oscillated. The safety valve lifted. The fuse nearly blew.

But ultimately, stability was restored.

And the Kathalgudi combined cycle plant did come online — not merely with gas and steam — but with mutual respect restored and relationships reset.

Sometimes leadership is not about avoiding confrontation.

It is about knowing when to stand firm — and when to step back — so that the larger project, and the larger purpose, can move forward.

2 comments:

G G Subhedar said...

Absolutely correct. Such situations do come in projects, when either the consultants or the customer engineers take a position of control rather than than that of cooperation. Only the project manager will face the situation....

samaranand's take said...

Thanks dear Subhedar for understanding the dilemma !